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HOW NFIB V. SEBELIUS AFFECTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GESTALT∗
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM

∗∗

I. INTRODUCTION: DIRECT AND INDIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS
This essay examines the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 the Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act.2 More precisely, what effects will NFIB have on the law—especially
constitutional law? We can divide these effects into two general categories, direct and indirect.
“Direct legal effects” are those created by and through legal norms. They include the operation
of legal orders (the mandate in an appellate opinion) and legal rules (stare decisis and the
doctrine of law of the case). “Indirect legal effects” are mediated by causal processes that are not
themselves instantiations of legal rules. For example, if a legal decision affects politics, and then
the political change affects the law, that change would constitute an indirect legal effect.
The Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius has already had important direct legal
consequences—the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has gone into effect, but with a significant
alteration in the incentive provided to the states to expand Medicaid coverage and eligibility.3
Via the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, NFIB could have direct effects in future lower-court
cases involving the Anti-Injunction Act4 and the spending power.5 On the Commerce Clause and
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1.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB v. Sebelius or NFIB].

2.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3.
The primary effects of the spending power holding may be on the bargaining processes between
states and the federal government over waivers from various requirements in the ACA. See Samuel R.
Bagenstos,Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Gillian Metzger et al. eds. 2013).
4.

26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).

5.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB,
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Necessary and Proper Clause issues, the direct legal effects are complex and likely to be
disputed. The strongest argument for a Commerce Clause holding postulates that NFIB has stare
decisis effects in cases in which another individual mandate (relevantly similar to the mandate in
the ACA) is enforced by a criminal penalty—or other penalty that could not be fairly
characterized as a tax via a saving construction.
Whatever direct legal effects the Court’s decision ultimately produces, the thesis of this
essay is that the most important and far-reaching legal effects of NFIB are likely to be indirect.
NFIB marks a destabilization of what we can call the “constitutional gestalt”6 regarding the
meaning and implications of what is referred to as the “New Deal Settlement.”7 The idea of a
“constitutional gestalt” will be explored in depth below,8 but the basic idea is that of an
interpretive framework that organizes our understanding of cases, theories, and narratives; we
can think of the constitutional gestalt as an abstract map of the constitutional landscape. Before
NFIB, the consensus understanding was that the New Deal and Warren Court cases had
established a constitutional regime of plenary and virtually unlimited national legislative power
under the Commerce Clause,9 although the regime might also contain narrow and limited carve-

101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013).
6.
The phrase “constitutional gestalt” is used here in a technical or stipulated sense, as described
below. See infra Part IV.C. The phrase itself has rarely been used in legal scholarship. But see Judith Resnik,
Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 680 (2010); Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1506 (1990). Subsequent to
my articulartion of this idea in drafts of this article and blog posts, the notion of a “constitutional gestalt” has been
discussed by other legal scholars. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Who Won the Obamacare Case (and Why Did so
Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2218387; Josh Blackmun, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16
CHAPMAN L. REV. 325, 326, 337-340 (2013).
7.
The phrase “New Deal Settlement” (alternatively, “New Deal constitutional settlement” or “New
Deal institutional settlement”) can be used in different ways. Here, I use the phrase to refer to two different versions
of the constitutional gestalt that frame our understanding of national legislative powers. The same phrase can also be
used to refer to the historical events during a particular period. When used in that way, reference to the New Deal
Settlement implicates the truth of particular claims about history. In this essay, I do not make such claims, which
may be problematic for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., G. Edward White, West Coast Hotel’s Place in American
Constitutional History, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 69 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/09/24/white.html. For uses
of the phrase, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism,
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 685 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875, 880 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: The Case
of the National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 186 (2012).
8.

See infra Part IV.C.

9.
See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 166 (1987) (observing that since
1937, the Court has recognized “virtually unlimited congressional power to regulate business activities under the
Commerce Clause.”); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857
n.255 (1995) (“[Wickard] construed Congress’s commerce powers as virtually unlimited.”); Matthew Adler, What
States Owe Outsiders, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 431 (1992) (“Congress now has the power to promulgate
every kind of regulation, including those that were once thought to lie within the state's exclusive ‘police’ power,
because every kind of regulatory problem may concern out-of-staters.”); David S. Bloch & William Robert Nelson
Jr., Defining “Health”: Three Visions and Their Ramifications, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 723, 728 (1997)
(characterizing the commerce power as “an almost unlimited police power”); Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents
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outs protective of the core of state sovereignty.10 After NFIB, the constitutional gestalt is
unsettled. In NFIB, five Justices of the Supreme Court endorsed a view of the Commerce
Clause11 that is inconsistent with the constitutional gestalt associated with the New Deal
Settlement.12 Endorsement of this view by a majority of the Court opens a fissure in
constitutional politics, creating space for an alternative constitutional gestalt. The core idea of the
alternative view is that the New Deal Settlement did not create plenary and virtually unlimited
legislative power. Instead, the alternative understanding is that the New Deal and Warren Court
cases as establishing only the constitutionality of particular federal programs, specific zones of
federal power, and particular modes of federal regulation. The most important indirect effect of
NFIB is that it enables constitutional contestation13 over the content of the gestalt and the
meaning of the New Deal Settlement.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Part II analyzes the structure of the
opinions in NFIB, and Part III examines the direct legal effects that these opinions will produce.
This discussion may seem dry and technical, even to Supreme Court enthusiasts. We will
examine what is called the “mandate”—the direct legal command contained in the opinion of the
Court and its implications for the vertical law-of-the-case effects of NFIB. We then will turn to
the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, which will require us to examine the convoluted structure of
the various opinions in the case. That will lead to the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis—the
precedential effect of NFIB on future decisions of the Supreme Court itself.

Pay: Interstate Child Support Enforcement after United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1477 (1996)
(“Since the New Deal, Congress has had virtually unlimited power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.”); Paul
G. Kauper, Supreme Court: Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 157 (1959-60) (“[T]he key
decisions under the Commerce Clause . . . resulted in a great and apparently unlimited expansion of federal authority
to deal with the nation's economic problems.”); Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm than Good: Assessing
Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 460 (1994) (“Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause has emerged as virtually unlimited.”); Alan N. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal
Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1020-21 (1988) (“The rational basis
test supports legislation that regulates purely local behavior for the purpose of promoting or protecting the public
health, welfare, or morality. . . . Not only has the commerce clause become the source of federal police power, it has
become an unlimited source.”); Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution:
Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 297, 333 (1991) (“Pursuant to the commerce clause, congressional
authority is extremely broad, if not virtually unlimited today, and nearly anything even remotely connected with
interstate commerce is subject to Congress’ plenary powers.”).
10.

See infra Part IV.D.1.

11.
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644–
2650 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12.
This constitutional gestalt can be called the “Dynamic New Deal Settlement.” See infra Part
IV.D.1. The core idea is that national legislative power is plenary and virtually unlimited.
13.
The phrase “constitutional contestation” is used infrequently in legal scholarship. For an early
example, see Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303 (2001). In this essay, my use of the phrase is influenced by the account of constitutional
contestation offered by Mariah Zeisberg. See MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: A POLITICAL THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGMENT (2013).
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***
Readers who are familiar with the complex structure of the opinions in NFIB may wish to
proceed directly to Part III on page [insert page number], discussing direct legal effects,
including the vertical and horizontal stare decisis effects of the decision. Other readers may wish
to proceed directly to Part IV on page [insert page number], which discusses the effect of the
decision on the constitutional gestalt.
***
The technical analysis in Part III leads to the conclusion that on the Commerce Clause
issue, NFIB is unlikely to produce stare decisis effects that are clear and uncontested—one way
or the other. That conclusion has an implication: NFIB opens up space for constitutional
contestation. That space is then examined in Part IV, which is about the indirect legal effects of
NFIB. We begin by examining the idea of a constitutional gestalt—a highly abstract feature of
constitutional thought and discourse that unifies constitutional theories, narratives, and doctrines.
We then turn to the effects of NFIB on the stability of the constitutional gestalt associated with
the New Deal Settlement. This leads to the core idea of the essay—that NFIB destabilizes the
constitutional gestalt, potentially (but not necessarily) enabling a constitutional gestalt shift. Part
V integrates the discussion of direct and indirect effects and draws some speculative conclusions
about the future of constitutional discourse and politics.
II. THE CASE AND THE OPINIONS
Before we examine the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision of NFIB v. Sebelius, we
need to unpack the issues and opinions. The first step is the usual, but hopefully brief, recitation
of the facts and procedural history.14
A.

The Facts and Procedural History

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted by Congress in 2010. It is a
complex statute—hundreds of provisions and some nine-hundred pages in length. Two
provisions of the ACA were challenged. The first is the individual mandate, which required
certain individuals to purchase qualifying health insurance.15 The second challenged provision is
Medicaid expansion, a portion of which effectively required states to provide Medicaid coverage
to adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level by withdrawing all federal

14
A detailed exploration of the history of NFIB v. Sebeleus is provided by JOSH BLACKMAN,
UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (forthcoming 2013). An important source of
scholarly commentary is found in a recent anthology edited by Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger, and Trevor W.
Morrison.
See THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian
E. Metzger, and Trevor W. Morrison eds. 2013). Another perspective on the history of the case if offered by a
compilation of blog posts from the Volokh Conspiracy. See RANDY E. BARNETT, ET AL, A CONSPIRACY AGAINST
OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Trevor Burrus, ed., Palgrave
forthcoming 2013).
15.

26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).
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Medicaid funds from noncomplying states.16
The day the ACA was signed into law, thirteen states filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The original plaintiffs were later joined
by an additional thirteen states, the National Federation of Independent Business, and several
individuals.17 The District Court held that Congress lacked legislative power to enact the
individual mandate, and that the mandate could not be severed—resulting in an order that struck
down the Act in its entirety.18 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the determination that Congress lacked legislative power to enact the individual
mandate, but reversed the determination that the mandate was not severable.19 The Eleventh
Circuit also rejected the challenge to the Medicaid expansion provisions.20 Two other circuits
rejected challenges to the individual mandate.21 One circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act
created a jurisdictional bar to the challenge.22 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit cases.
The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act was not a barrier to challenge the
mandate and upheld that provision of the ACA on the basis of the tax power.23 In addition, a
portion of Justice Roberts’s opinion that was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan,24 in
conjunction with the joint dissent by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,25 has the
effect that the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA are unconstitutional to the extent that
these provisions threaten states with the loss of existing Medicaid funding.
Formally, there are four opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius, but different constellations of
Justices join different portions of these four opinions. Functionally, we can identify seven
distinct opinions—each joined by a different set of Justices. These seven functional opinions
address five distinct issues. The clearest way to reduce the opinions’ complexity is to outline
their structure and relationship to the issues.
B.

Functionally, Seven Opinions on Five Issues

16.

42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).

17.

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).

18.
Fla. 2011).

Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1306 (N.D.

19.
Cir. 2011).

Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th

20.

Id. at 1268.

21.
See Seven–Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 15–20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama,
651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
22.

Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 414–15 (4th Cir. 2011).

23.

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 2566, 2594-2600 (2012).

24.

Id. at 2601-08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).

25.

Id. at 2642-77 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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The following overview will identify the seven opinions and the five issues. To
understand the opinions, it is necessary first to identify the five issues addressed by the Court,
presented as Table 1: Issues in NFIB v. Sebelius.
TABLE 1: ISSUES IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS
Issue

Issue

Outcome

Anti-Injunction Act

Did the Anti-Injunction Act
bar the challenge to the
individual mandate?

No, holding in the
opinion of the Court.

Commerce Clause

Was the individual mandate
within Congress’s Commerce
Clause power?

Disputed. Five justices
say “no.”

Necessary and Proper
Clause

Was the individual mandate
within Congress’s power
pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause?

Disputed. Five justices
say “no.”

Tax Power

Was the individual mandate
supported by Congress’s tax
power?

Yes, either directly or
via a saving
construction.

Spending Power

Was the requirement that
states expand Medicaid or
lose existing Medicaid
funding supported by
Congress’s spending power?

No. Three justices join
an opinion to this effect,
and five justices would
strike the Medicaid
provisions down in their
entirety.

Step two is to identify the distinct opinions. There are four formal opinions with six
authors; they function, however, as seven distinct opinions. Justice Roberts authored an opinion,
portions of which were the opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg authored an opinion, different
parts of which were joined by different Justices. There was a joint dissenting opinion authored by
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Finally, Justice Thomas had a separate dissenting opinion.
Here is the official statement:
ROBERTS, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III–C, in which GINSBURG,
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined; an opinion with respect to
Part IV, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined; and an opinion with respect
to Parts III–A, III–B, and III–D. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which
SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to
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Parts I, II, III, and IV. SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., filed a
dissenting opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.26
This dense prose can be unpacked as a table:
TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF THE OPINIONS
Author
Roberts

Parts of the
Opinion

Joined by . . .

I, II, III-C

5

Issues

Formal Status

Anti-Injunction
Act

Opinion of the
Court

(Total, Names)
Ginsburg,
Breyer,
Sotomayor,

Tax Power

Kagan
Roberts

Preface, III- 1
A, III-B,
III-D,
Conclusion

None

Role of the Court
Commerce Clause

Separate
Opinion

Necessary and
Proper Clause
Tax Power and the
Avoidance Canon
Relationship of
Commerce Clause
Analysis to Tax
Power Holding
The Court’s
Holding and
Mandate

Roberts

IV

3

Breyer,

Spending Power

Separate
Opinion

Breyer,

Commerce Clause

Kagan,

Necessary and
Proper Clause

Concurring in
Part,
Concurring in
the Judgment

Kagan,
Ginsburg

I, II, III, IV

4

Sotomayor

Tax Power
Ginsburg

V

2

Sotomayor

Spending Power

Dissenting in
Part

Joint

Entirety

4

Kennedy,

Anti-Injunction

Dissenting

26.

Id. at 2575 (syllabus).
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Opinion

Scalia,

Act

Thomas,

Commerce Clause

Alito

Necessary and
Proper Clause

Opinion

Spending Power
Thomas

Entirety

1

None

Commerce Clause
Necessary and
Proper Clause

C.

Dissenting
Opinion

The Seven Functionally Distinct Opinions

The next step is to summarize each of the seven functionally distinct opinions with
respect to the five issues.
1.

The Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court is contained in Parts I, II, and III-C of the opinion authored by
Chief Justice Roberts. Part I is simply a summary of the facts and procedural history.27 This part
of the opinion of the Court is not important to determination of the direct or indirect legal effects.
Part II addresses the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides, “[N]o suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”28 The
Court’s conclusion was straightforward: “The Affordable Care Act does not require that the
penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax for purposes of the
Anti–Injunction Act. The Anti–Injunction Act therefore does not apply to this suit, and we may
proceed to the merits.”29 The only complexity to be noted is that the holding that the ACA was
not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act might be thought to be in some tension with the
holding that the individual mandate was a tax for the purposes of Congress’s tax power.
Part III-C of the opinion of the Court addresses the tax power. There are two steps to the
argument: (1) the shared responsibility payment enforcing the individual mandates can be
characterized as a tax supported by the power conferred by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution;30 and (2) so characterized, the provision is not a direct tax in violation of Article I,
Section 9, Clause 4.31 The upshot of Part III-C is that the shared responsibility payment
associated with the individual mandate is within Congress’s Article I legislative power.

27.

Id. at 2580-83 (majority opinion).

28.

26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).

29.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584.

30.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

31.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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2.

Justice Roberts’s Separate Opinion on the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause

Some portions of Justice Roberts’s opinion are entirely his own, joined by no other
members of the Court. Structurally, these portions are contained in five distinct parts of his
opinion:
1.

a preface, addressing the role of the Supreme Court;

2.
Part III-A, addressing the argument that the individual mandate is
supported by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause;
3.
Part III-B, addressing the avoidance canon in relationship to the tax
power;
4.
Part III-D, addressing the necessity of the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause analyses to the Court’s disposition of the case; and
5.

a conclusion, addressing the holding and mandate.

Three of these distinct parts are critical to understanding the legal effects of Justice
Roberts’s opinion. Part III-A contains his analysis of the Commerce Clause: he concludes that
the individual mandate (construed as a legal requirement enforced by a penalty) is not a
regulation of interstate commerce. Justice Roberts articulated the key distinction between
permissible regulations of activity and impermissible mandates premised on inactivity as
follows:
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial
activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by
purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate
commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and
potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not
do an infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in
others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by
pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and—
under the Government's theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for
him.32
In other words, because the individual mandate was not predicated on some form of activity, it
did not qualify as a regulation of commerce.
Justice Roberts then turned to the government’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument.
The reasoning flows from the activity-inactivity distinction:
Applying these principles, the individual mandate cannot be sustained
under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance

32.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
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reforms. Each of our prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved
exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. . . . The
individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to
create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.33
And if the mandate were constitutional:
No longer would Congress be limited to regulating under the Commerce Clause
those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of
federal regulation. Instead, Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its
authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be
outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is “necessary” to the Act's insurance
reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a “proper” means for making
those reforms effective.34
Thus, the individual mandate was neither a regulation of interstate commerce nor a proper means
of carrying other provisions of the ACA into effect.
3.

Justice Roberts’s Separate Opinion on the Spending Clause, Joined by Justices
Breyer and Kagan

Part IV of Justice Roberts’s opinion, addressing the Spending Clause issue, was joined by
Justices Breyer and Kagan. The core of the reasoning is contained in the following passage:
In this case, the financial “inducement” Congress has chosen is much
more than “relatively mild encouragement”—it is a gun to the head. Section
1396c of the Medicaid Act provides that if a State's Medicaid plan does not
comply with the Act's requirements, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
may declare that “further payments will not be made to the State.” A State that
opts out of the Affordable Care Act's expansion in health care coverage thus
stands to lose not merely “a relatively small percentage” of its existing Medicaid
funding, but all of it. Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the
average State's total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those
costs. . . . The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's overall budget . . . is
economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in
the Medicaid expansion.35
Justice Roberts’s opinion extends South Dakota v. Dole, which upheld under the spending power
a provision authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal
transportation funds from any state that failed to set its minimum drinking age at twenty-one.36
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court stated, “[I]n some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure

33.

Id. at 2592.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 2604-05.

36.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1987).
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turns into compulsion.’”37
There is already substantial controversy about the best reading of this portion of the
opinion. Because four Justices would have held the Medicaid expansion provisions invalid in
their entirety, this portion of Justice Roberts’s opinion is clearly controlling under the narrowest
grounds rule. What is not so clear is what the vertical stare decisis effects will be—an issue that
is discussed below.
4.

Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion on the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper
Clause, and Tax Power Issues

The entirety of Justice Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting opinion was joined by
Justice Sotomayor.38 Parts I, II, III, and IV were also joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan39:
these sections address the national power issues (Commerce, Tax, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause). Justice Ginsburg’s analysis of the national power issues begins with the Commerce
Clause, about which she makes two observations: “First, Congress has the power to regulate
economic activities ‘that substantially affect interstate commerce.’”40 And, “[s]econd, we owe a
large measure of respect to Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social
legislation.”41 Applying these observations to the facts of NFIB, Ginsburg concludes:
Straightforward application of these principles would require the Court to
hold that the minimum coverage provision is proper Commerce Clause
legislation. Beyond dispute, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the
uninsured, as a class, substantially affect interstate commerce. Those without
insurance consume billions of dollars of health-care products and services each
year. Those goods are produced, sold, and delivered largely by national and
regional companies who routinely transact business across state lines. The
uninsured also cross state lines to receive care. Some have medical emergencies
while away from home. Others, when sick, go to a neighboring State that provides
better care for those who have not prepaid for care.42
Most of the remainder of her opinion consists of responses to and criticisms of the
reasoning in Justice Roberts’s opinion. But notably, in responding to Justice Roberts’s contention
that allowing Congress to mandate purchases is necessary to avoid an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that would be unlimited, Justice Ginsburg endorses the Court’s decisions in
Lopez and Morrison because they exclude “regulat[ion] [of] noneconomic conduct that has only
an attenuated effect on interstate commerce and is traditionally left to state law” from the

37.

Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

38.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17

41.

Id. (citations omitted).

42.

Id. at 2617 (citations omitted).

(2005)).
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commerce power.43
Justice Ginsburg also argues that the individual mandate would be sustainable under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it were not itself a regulation of interstate commerce.44 Part
IV of her opinion addresses the larger implications of Justice Roberts’s opinion:
In the early 20th century, this Court regularly struck down economic
regulation enacted by the peoples' representatives in both the States and the
Federal Government. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s Commerce Clause opinion, and
even more so the joint dissenters' reasoning bear a disquieting resemblance to
those long-overruled decisions.45
This portion of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion suggests that the Chief Justice’s approach undermines
the New Deal Settlement—a theme to which we shall return below.46
5.

Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion on the Spending Power Issue

Part V of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, joined only by Justice Sotomayor, addresses the
Medicaid expansion and the Spending Clause.47 Of the nine members of the Court, only
Ginsburg and Sotomayor would uphold the conditioning of Medicaid funds on state cooperation
with the Medicaid expansion required by the ACA.
One theme in this portion of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is cooperative federalism. In this
context, the suggestion is that the alternative to conditional spending is federalization, which
would provide a contracted role for the states.48 Ginsburg argues that the Court’s conditional
spending precedents do not support the Chief Justice’s distinction between old and new
Medicaid funds.49 Justice Ginsburg also argues that coercion was not present because
conditioned funds were all Medicaid funds (and not unrelated funds)50 and because there is no
judicially manageable standard for “coercion.”51
6.

The Joint Dissent

The joint dissenting opinion, authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
addresses the Commerce Clause, tax power, Anti-Injunction Act, and Medicaid expansion issues,
as well as severability, concluding that the entire Affordable Care Act should be struck down.52

43.

Id. at 2623 (citations omitted).

44.

Id. at 2625-28.

45.

Id. at 2628–29 (citations omitted).

46.

See infra Part IV.D.

47.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629-42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting).

48.

Id. at 2632-33.

49.

Id. at 2633–34.

50.

Id. at 2634

51.

Id. at 2641.

52.

Id. at 2677 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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The joint dissent argues that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause for reasons that are similar to, but
distinct from, those offered by the Chief Justice. Adopting the premise that Congress’s
legislative power must be limited, the joint dissent argues that extending the power to include
mandates to participate in the market would create power without limits.53 This limit applies to
the Necessary and Proper Clause as well: “[T]he scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is
exceeded not only when the congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States
but also when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal
power.”54
On the tax power issue, the key move is the joint dissent’s argument that the penalty
provision could not fairly be interpreted as a tax because it is triggered by a violation of the
law.55 On the Anti-Injunction Act, the joint dissent argued that its analysis of the tax power
question essentially disposed of the jurisdictional question as well.56 On the Medicaid expansion
issue, the reasoning of the joint dissent is very close to that of the Chief Justice, emphasizing that
the sheer size of Medicaid funding makes any condition on its receipt coercive.57 The joint
dissent’s discussion of the severability issue is complex and will not be summarized here.58
7.

Justice Thomas’s Opinion

The final opinion was authored by Justice Thomas. The sole point of this opinion is to
restate Justice Thomas’s longstanding objection to the substantial effects doctrine.59
***
In summary, there are seven functionally distinct opinions. These amount to an opinion
of the Court on the Anti-Injunction Act and the tax power. Additionally, a majority of justices
align on the invalidity of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, albeit in two distinct opinions. Given that a total of three Justices support the
invalidation of conditioning of new funds on state acceptance of Medicaid expansion and that
four Justices support the invalidation of so-conditioning any funds, it follows that seven Justices
would support the narrower outcome (striking down the new funds condition) in the Chief
Justice’s opinion.
III. DIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS: THE MANDATE AND STARE DECISIS
What are the direct legal effects of NFIB? Direct legal effects are the legal norms created

53.

Id. at 2646.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 2651-52.

56.

Id. at 2655-56.

57.

Id. at 2662-64.

58.

See id. at 2668-76.

59.
See id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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by the Supreme Court’s decision and the Justices’ opinions. We can divide direct effects into
three categories. The first and most immediate legal effects are the result of what is called the
“mandate” and the associated doctrine of law of the case.60 A second set of legal effects is
created by the doctrine of vertical stare decisis as it affects the lower federal courts and the courts
of the several states.61 A third set of legal effects is created by the doctrine of horizontal stare
decisis—the doctrine of precedent applied by the Supreme Court to its own prior decisions.62
A.

The Mandate and Law of the Case

The most direct legal effect of a Supreme Court decision is achieved via the mandate—
the formal direction the Court gives to the lower federal courts in the case.63 (The discussion that
follows uses the term “mandate” in this sense—not to be confused with the “individual
mandate,” to which I shall always refer by using the whole two-word phrase.) In Supreme Court
decisions, the mandate is a function of the judgment, which is announced at the end of the
opinion.64 Because of the fragmented nature of the opinions, the precise content of the mandate
in NFIB requires a careful parsing of the various opinions. It has at least three distinct
components: (1) affirming the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of the Anti-Injunction Act challenge
to the district court’s jurisdiction; (2) reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that the penalty
provision enforcing the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act was beyond the
legislative power of Congress; and (3) affirming in part and reversing in part the Eleventh
Circuit’s determination that the Medicaid expansion provision was within Congress’s power.
Formally, this portion of the opinion is expressed in the final passages of Justice Roberts’s
opinion, “The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. It is so ordered.”65
Because we need to refer to the various portions of Justice Roberts’s opinion, it may be
helpful to briefly summarize the sections in the form of a chart:
TABLE 3: STRUCTURE OF JUSTICE ROBERTS'S OPINION

60.
See James Wm. Moore & Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of
the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514 (1943).
61.
See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 823-24 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994); Mark Alan
Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 436-37 (1992). The doctrine of vertical stare decisis may have different implications
for state courts, but it is clear that state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on
questions of federal law. See, e.g., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
62.
See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 57–58.
63.
When the Court exercises appellate or certiorari jurisdiction, its formal mandate binds the lower
federal courts, but the Court does not address its orders to the parties. Trial courts can issue coercive orders to the
parties, and the content of such orders may be controlled by the Supreme Court’s mandate directed to lower courts.
64.

See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609.

65.

Id.
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Part of the Opinion

Topic Addressed

Status

Part I

Facts and Procedural History

Opinion of the Court

Part II

Anti-Injunction Act

Opinion of the Court

Part III-A

Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause

Justice Roberts

Part III-B

Tax Power

Justice Roberts

Part III-C

Tax Power

Opinion of the Court

Part III-D

Necessity of Part III-A

Justice Roberts

Part IV

Spending Power

Justice Roberts joined by
Justices Breyer and
Kagan

The first component of the mandate follows directly from Part II of Justice Roberts’s
opinion; this Part was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan and hence
constitutes the opinion of the Court.66 Part II directly affirms the Eleventh Circuit on the AntiInjunction Act issue.67 The second component of the mandate follows from Part III-C of Justice
Roberts’s opinion joined by the same four Justices68. Part III-C reverses the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision insofar as it failed to adopt a saving construction of the individual mandate. The third
component of the mandate is more complex. Part IV of Justice Roberts’s opinion, joined by
Justices Breyer and Kagan, concludes that the Medicaid expansion violates the Constitution by
threatening states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with
the provisions of the ACA that expanded the scope of the Medicaid program and increased the
number of individuals the states must cover as a condition of their receipt of federal funds.69
Because four Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) would have struck down the entire
ACA,70 Part IV of Justice Roberts’s opinion would control in subsequent proceedings in the
lower federal courts.71 The consequence is that preexisting Medicaid funding cannot be denied to
states that do not implement the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA.
The immediate legal effect of the mandate is accompanied by additional legal
consequences that flow from the closely related doctrine called the “law of the case.” The law-

66.

Id. at 2575.

67.

Id. at 2582-84.

68.

Id. at 2594-2600.

69.

Id. at 2601-08.

70.

Id. at 2642-77.

71.

This flows from the narrowest grounds rule, discussed below. See infra Part III.B.2 and note 86.
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of-the-case doctrine has two dimensions, which we can call “vertical” and “horizontal.”72 The
vertical dimension of the law-of-the-case doctrine requires any lower court in subsequent
proceedings in the NFIB case itself to follow the Supreme Court’s determinations. The vertical
law-of-the-case doctrine is binding on any lower court that hears subsequent proceedings in the
same case. The horizontal dimension of the law-of-the-case doctrine would apply to the Supreme
Court itself if any portion of NFIB should return to the Court on a subsequent appeal. The
horizontal law-of-the-case doctrine is not binding: the Court has the power to reverse itself on
issues determined in a prior decision in the same case.73
The law-of-the-case doctrine (a cousin of the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel) only applies to issues that were actually decided,74 and hence has no relevance to issues
not presented to the Court in NFIB, including, for example, the question of whether the penalty
provision enforcing the individual mandate violates the Origination Clause of Article I.
In practice, the most important direct-and-immediate effects of the Supreme Court’s
decision in NFIB are produced by the mandate and the vertical law-of-the-case doctrine. As a
consequence of the mandate, the penalty provisions will go into effect, absent the success of a
legal challenge on some basis not considered by the Court in NFIB. If any state chooses not to
accept Congress’s offer of Medicaid funding for the new beneficiary classes, that state will not
be subject to the possible withdrawal of funding for the pre-2010 classes of beneficiaries.75
B.

Vertical Stare Decisis

Supreme Court decisions create a second kind of direct legal effect as a consequence of
the doctrine of vertical stare decisis or precedent. Vertical stare decisis operates with respect to
issues of federal law and binds courts that are lower than the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of
authority—that is, the lower federal courts and the courts of the several states. Horizontal stare
decisis operates within a court. The Supreme Court is not bound by horizontal stare decisis—
more on this later.76
In many cases, the precedential effect of a Supreme Court decision is relatively clear—
the rule, as implied by the rationale necessary for the result, is stated unambiguously in a
majority opinion, perhaps in a sentence that begins with the words, “we hold that”. In other
cases, the vertical stare decisis effect of a Supreme Court decision may be quite murky. There
may be no “opinion of the Court” on a particular issue, and the relationship between elements of

72.
See Thomas L. Fowler & Thomas P. Davis, Reconsideration of Interlocutory Orders: A Critical
Reassessment of Calloway v. Ford Motor Co. and Whether One Judge May Overrule Another, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1797, 1814 n.49 (2000).
73.

Consovoy, supra note 62, at 57-58.

74.
E.g., Wilmer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Leavenworth Cnty., 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“[O]nly matters actually decided, explicitly or implicitly, become law of the case . . . .” (citing Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 9, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1993))).
75.
I owe thanks to Marty Lederman for this precise formulation of the effects of the mandate with
respect to the Spending Clause.
76.

See discussion infra Part III.C.
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the reasoning and the outcome may not be clear. There is another factor that clouds the doctrine
of vertical stare decisis: the content of the doctrine is contested both at the surface level of detail
and the deep level of theory.
In the case of NFIB, some of the vertical stare decisis effects are relatively clear. The
Anti-Injunction Act holding would seem to apply to any financial exaction that Congress
describes as a penalty and does not describe as a tax. It may be more difficult to formulate the
holding with respect to the unconstitutionality of conditioning “old” Medicaid funding to states
on the states’ compliance with the expansion of Medicaid benefits and eligibility criteria.
Perhaps the withdrawal of funding of the same magnitude (10% of the states’ total budgets)
would be subject to the same restriction under a variety of reasonable formulations of the
holding.77
1.

Vertical Stare Decisis Effects of the Opinion of the Court

The most difficult vertical stare decisis question concerns the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The opinion of the Court contains a passage that, on the surface,
asserts that the invalidity of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause is part of the
holding. Here is the passage: “The Court today holds that our Constitution protects us from
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated
activity.”78
Repetition may be important for clarity: the passage quoted above is in the opinion of the
Court, not the separate opinion of Justice Roberts. In the initial wave of reaction to NFIB, this
passage went mostly unnoticed.79 At a minimum, statements that use language like “the Court
today holds” are evidence of what the holding actually is.80 In practice, lower courts and brief
writers frequently treat such statements as if they have enactment force that binds the lower

77.
See generally Bagenstos, supra note 5 (discussing effects of NFIB’s Spending Clause holding);
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (providing interpretation of the Medicaid expansion
holding); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (arguing that the Spending Clause holding of NFIB is unstable); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional
Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577 (2013) (arguing
that the Spending Clause holding will have limited effects).
78.

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).

79.
But see Randy Barnett, Quote of the Week, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 12:41 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/quote-of-the-week/; Michael E. Rosman, The Decision (with Apologies to
Lebron James), POINTOFLAW.COM (June 28, 2012, 5:55 PM),
http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/archives/2012/06/the-decision-with-apologies-to-lebron-james.php; Ilya Somin,
A Simple Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 3:47 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-mess.
80.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 188-89 (2006); cf. Bradley Scott
Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 685 (2006) (arguing that “we hold that”
statements are not binding without discussion of evidentiary role of such statements).
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courts. 81 Let’s call such statements, “we-hold-that statements.”
The fact that lower courts treat we-hold-that statements as having enactment force does
not mean that they do. Because the mandate reverses the Eleventh Circuit on the congressional
power issue, the we-hold-that statement, on the surface, appears to be unnecessary to the
decision: the result (affirmance) flows from the opinion of the Court on the basis of its tax power
reasoning. Hence, this statement seems to be obiter dictum.
But things are more complicated than the surface of the opinion of the Court suggests.
One complication arises from the incompletely theorized nature of the doctrine of vertical stare
decisis. This is not the occasion for a full rehearsal of the current state of the law and the
theoretical debates about the nature of stare decisis that raged in past decades.82 I will simply
observe that many important questions are not clearly resolved.
For present purposes, the important point is that the doctrine of vertical stare decisis is
not as clear as many legal practitioners and academics may believe. There is, to be sure, a
formalist version of the doctrine that is rooted in the idea of the ratio decidendi83: the holding of
a case is the rule that is logically implied by the stated reasons necessary to the resolution of the
case on the facts before the appellate court and the legal arguments presented by the parties. But
there is another tradition of thinking about stare decisis that views the holding of a case as the
rule that best predicts the future behavior of a court from the opinions expressed by the judges.84
This predictive theory normally affords great weight to we-hold-that statements on the theory
that judges themselves do not sign on to such statements unless they are willing to back them up
in future cases. Judges may say other things, but these statements may be “cheap talk” because
they do not clearly communicate a commitment to future action.
If we return to the opinion of the Court in NFIB, the two theories seem, on the surface, to
lead to different conclusions regarding the scope of the holding. If holdings are limited to the
ratio decidendi, then the self-identified “holding” quoted above would be mere dicta—it was not
necessary to the resolution of the congressional power issue. But if holdings are predictions, then
the passage quoted could be important evidence that the Justices have committed themselves to
the stated rule of law.

81.
Cf. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice In Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2021 (2013) (reporting results of systematic empirical study
showing “that lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement from a higher court because it is dictum”).
82.
See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1991); NEIL
DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT,THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT (2008); see generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS.
L. REV. 771 (providing a selective history of the doctrine of precedent).
83.
See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 161 (1930)
(elaborating theory of the ration decidendi).
84.
See Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and Judicial Estoppel, in 18 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.03[4] (3d ed. 1997); see also Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 87, 99 & n.43 (1999); Jeremy B. Stein, Note, The Necessary Language of Exceptions: A Response to
Frederick Schauer's “Exceptions,” 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 99, 114 (2007).
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Even under the predictive theory of holdings, the quoted passage may be outweighed by
other evidence predictive of future behavior by the Justices who joined Part III-C. The quoted
passage is isolated within Part III-C, which does not provide reasoning that would support the
holding. That reasoning is provided in Part III-A, but that part is the opinion of Justice Roberts
alone. Extrinsic evidence suggests that the four Justices who joined Roberts in Part III-C do not
view themselves as committed on the Commerce Clause issue: Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, explicitly and forcefully expressed their disagreement
with Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause reasoning. Of course, four other Justices (Kennedy,
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) authored the joint dissent that agrees in spirit with Part III-A. But
they pointedly did not join Part III-A.
These complexities are likely to lead to speculation. For example, it is possible that the
quoted passage was written on the assumption that Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would
join Part III-A of Justice Roberts’s opinion. If they had, that portion of the opinion would have
been denominated an “opinion of the Court.” But they did not join Part III-A. One might
speculate that the quoted passage was left in the opinion by accident, or that Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan knowingly agreed to this passage—as part of a compromise
reached with Justice Roberts. Of course, either of these scenarios would be odd. Supreme Court
Justices and their clerks surely know that we-hold-that statements are important, but odd things
do happen.
Some might think that the extrinsic evidence deprives the quoted passage of evidentiary
value, and hence that it cannot serve as the basis of a prediction. That argument would be
decisive if Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito substantially disagreed with the
reasoning of Part III-A of Justice Roberts’s opinion, but they do not. What they do say suggests
that, functionally and substantively, they are mostly on board with Part III-A. From the
perspective of the predictive theory, the extrinsic evidence actually supports the claim that the
passage in the opinion of the Court predicts the future behavior of the Justices.
The view that we-hold-that statements are particularly important in making predictions is
a view about their evidentiary function. If there is contradictory evidence (and there is), the
balance of evidence should control: we can call this idea, the “balance of evidence standard.”
The balance-of-evidence standard leads to another evidentiary heuristic for the predictive
theory—the so-called “rule of five.” If you can count five votes for a position, that position has
predictive value. Of course, the quality of the evidence counts. One might attempt to predict the
future behavior of the Court based on the general ideological characteristics of the individual
justices. From the point of view of the predictive theory, that kind of evidence is likely to be
unsatisfactory because this sort of prediction does not produce the level of confidence required
by the predictive theory of precedent. Lower federal courts are not entitled to disregard Supreme
Court holdings on the basis of educated guesses about the future behavior of the Supreme
Court—the Court itself has said that.85 The predictive theory of precedent requires that the

85.
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent
of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,
the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.”).
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predictions flow from strong evidence found within Supreme Court decisions. So the holding of
a case is a prediction made from evidence that is internal to the opinions of the Justices.
2.

Vertical Stare Decisis Effects of All the Opinions Under the Narrowest Grounds
Rule

Once we have all the opinions in view, we need to consider the possible effects of the
narrowest grounds rule.86 The content of that rule is unclear,87 but we can tease out some of the
implications without a precise version of the rule. We are going to begin with the formalist
version—the narrowest grounds rule as it would be formulated within the general approach of
the ratio decidendi theory of precedent. The rule was stated in Marks v. United States as follows:
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”88 The Ninth Circuit
suggested that Marks requires the lower federal courts to find the “legal standard which, when
applied, will necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would
agree.”89 If there is no such opinion, “the only binding aspect of a splintered decision is its
specific result.”90
What are the criteria for “narrowest”? Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns
suggest that narrowness is defined relevant to the effect produced: “When the Court strikes down
a law on constitutional grounds, the rule seeks the opinion consistent with the outcome that
would strike down the fewest laws. Conversely, when the Court sustains a law against a
constitutional challenge, the narrowest grounds opinion is that opinion consistent with the
outcome that would sustain the fewest laws.”91
How does the narrowest grounds rule apply to NFIB? Consider first the implications of
Part III-D of Justice Roberts’s opinion:
Justice GINSBURG questions the necessity of rejecting the Government's
commerce power argument, given that § 5000A can be upheld under the taxing
power. But the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than

86.
See Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760-61 (1980) (discussing narrowest grounds rule); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977).
87.
E.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (stating, “[I]t [is] not useful to pursue
the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that
have considered it.”).
88.

Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted).

89.
United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
90.
United States v. Rodriguez–Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.) (quoting Anker Energy Corp.
v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999)), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005).
91.
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of
Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1912 (2001).
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as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is
only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is
necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we have a
duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be
interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would
find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy
health insurance. Section 5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if read as a
command.92
The ground articulated by Chief Justice Roberts would be narrowest—in that it would only
sustain laws that were taxes or that could reasonably be construed as taxes, and it would not
sustain laws that could only be upheld under the Commerce Clause. The rationale in Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion would be broader because it would sustain laws of both types.
Even if Justice Roberts’s rationale is narrowest, is it necessary? One might argue that
even given the ratio decidendi theory of the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, the Commerce
Clause reasoning is in fact necessary to the validation of congressional power to enact the
penalty provisions of the ACA. How would that argument go? It might begin with the
observation that the reasoning concerning the Commerce Clause in Part III-A and Part III-D of
Justice Roberts’s opinion is necessary to the chain of reasoning that produced the outcome,
because absent the Commerce Clause reasoning, Roberts would not have even reached the tax
power issue.
This reasoning might be challenged by arguing that Justice Roberts would not have
reached the Commerce Clause issue if he had used the modern version of the avoidance canon.
Mark Tushnet made precisely this argument shortly after the decision in NFIB was made:
There is a “canon” of statutory construction known as the “constitutional
avoidance” canon. It comes in two versions, now labeled the “classical” version
and the “modern” one. On the modern version, a judge faced with a statute that,
most naturally read, raises difficult constitutional questions, should adopt instead
a construction—if one is fairly available—that does not raise such questions. On
the modern version, then, the Chief Justice didn't have to address the Commerce
Clause question; all he needed to do was to note that the question was difficult
and that construing the statute to impose a tax was an available reading.93
Tushnet’s conclusion is that Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause reasoning was
unnecessary, but his argument for that conclusion is not fully developed. A fuller analysis
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requires a more precise formulation of what we can call the “necessity component” of the
narrowest grounds rule. This need arises because of the distinction between (1) reasons that are
necessary to the result and (2) reasons that are necessary elements of a set of actually articulated
reasons that are jointly sufficient to support the result. This distinction may sound technical, but
it is crucially important. Few reasons are absolutely necessary to a decision; in many cases the
outcome could have been reached on the basis of many different reasons. The alternative idea
focuses on the actually articulated reasons and asks which of these is a member of a set of
reasons that are jointly sufficient to justify the outcome. The alternative captures the ordinary
lawyer’s distinction between holding and obiter dictum.
These two distinct ideas of what “necessary” means can be translated into two
formulations of the necessity component of the narrowest grounds rule. For the purposes of the
narrowest grounds rule, a reason is deemed “necessary to the outcome” if and only if:
Formulation One: The outcome could not have been reached absent the reason.
Formulation Two: The reason is actually given in one of the opinions, and the
reason forms a necessary element of a set of reasons that are jointly sufficient to
produce the result.
If holdings are limited by Formulation One, then the set of holdings will be very small
indeed, since alternative reasons could have been provided for almost any possible result reached
by an appellate court in any possible case. For the ratio decidendi theory to be plausible, it must
focus on the reasons actually provided; the theoretical availability of a reason not actually
articulated in opinions of the judges in the case does negate the necessity of a premise in the
chain or reasons that are actually offered. Formulation Two is also consistent with an actual
statement of the Marks rule: “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”94 It is the “position
taken” and not “the narrowest position that could have been taken” that provides the holding.
When more than one chain of reasoning is actually offered and sufficient to support the result,
the result is alternative holdings. Formulation Two takes these complexities into account.
Consider again the argument that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts’s
opinion is dicta because he could have relied on the modern version of the avoidance canon.95
This argument works perfectly on Formulation One. Justice Roberts could have reasoned
differently, by relying on the modern formulation of the avoidance canon, and therefore, this
discussion of the Commerce Clause is dicta. But Formulation One suggests an even simpler basis
for the argument that the interstate commerce reasoning is dicta. Justice Roberts could simply
have accepted the tax power argument endorsed by Justice Ginsburg; if he had done that, he
would not even have had to mention the Commerce Clause. By the same reasoning, the tax
power discussion is also unnecessary, since Roberts could have decided the case on the basis of
the Commerce Clause. Formulation One is very stringent indeed, and if we accept it, then it is
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not clear that there is any holding on the federal power issue in NFIB.
Formulation Two, on the other hand, suggests a more precise version of the argument that
Roberts’s Commerce Clause reasoning was necessary. The Commerce Clause reasoning in Part
III-A and Part III-D of Justice Roberts’s opinion is a necessary element in a chain of reasoning
that was articulated and is itself sufficient to support the result. It is a necessary element because
the chain of reasoning actually offered by Justice Roberts depends on it. That chain of reasoning
(contained in Parts III-A, III-B & III-C) is sufficient to produce the outcome on the question of
whether Congress had power to enact the Affordable Care Act. Hence the Commerce Clause
reasoning satisfies the standard set in Formulation Two.
There is another basis for the contention that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Parts IIIA and III-D in Justice Roberts’s opinion was necessary to the result in NFIB. What was the
result? One way to characterize the result is that the Court upheld the individual mandate, but
that characterization is only approximately correct. We can be more precise. What the Court
actually did was to uphold the penalty provisions that enforced the individual mandate. It did this
by adopting a saving construction of Section 5000A that negates the command (the mandate to
purchase insurance) by construing the penalty as a tax (which does not create a legal obligation
to purchase insurance). That there is a difference between the two is absolutely clear from the
following two hypotheticals:
Hypothetical One: Suppose that Congress had enacted a statute that explicitly
stated that the penalty provisions were valid only if they enforced a legal
obligation to purchase insurance.
Had Section 5000A been written this way, it would have been struck down because the saving
construction would have been unavailable. Now consider the second hypothetical:
Hypothetical Two: Suppose that Justice Roberts had concluded that the
Commerce Clause did support the individual mandate as a legal obligation.
In that case, he would not have adopted the saving construction of Section 5000A and would
instead have concluded that a legal obligation to purchase insurance (enforceable by a financial
penalty or, hypothetically, by imprisonment) was within the scope of congressional power. The
juxtaposition of the two hypotheticals makes it clear that the Commerce Clause reasoning was
required to reach the precise result reached in NFIB.
But there is a counter-argument. One might argue that the difference between a saving
construction that upholds the penalty as a tax but negates the legal obligation is merely formal
because the saving construction is functionally equivalent to the result of a decision that upheld
the legal obligation and the tax under the Commerce Clause. This argument can be elaborated via
the “bad man” theory articulated by Justice Holmes.96 From the perspective of the bad man, the
only thing that matters is the penalty. The bad man does not care about obligations; he cares
about consequences.
Of course, this move does not end the argument. The bad man theory of the nature of law
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is controversial, to say the least.97 Alternative views of the nature of law contend that legal
obligations can have motivational force that is independent of legally prescribed rewards and
punishments. These are deep waters, and the debates concerning the nature of law and their
relationship to the bad man theory cannot be resolved in this essay. This much is clear: to the
extent that the argument against viewing the Commerce Clause reasoning as part of the holding
rests on the correctness of some version of the bad man theory, it cannot command consensus
support among legal theorists or judges.
Even if one accepts the bad man theory, there is a strong argument that Justice Roberts’s
saving construction could make a difference to someone motivated only by rewards and
punishments. Consider the following hypothetical:
Hypothetical Three: Suppose that Congress amends the Affordable Care Act,
eliminating the financial penalty enforced by the Internal Revenue Service and
substituting a criminal penalty enforced by the Department of Justice. The
criminal penalty is then challenged in a district court, and the plaintiff argues that
NFIB is controlling and that the criminal penalty is invalid.
Given this hypothetical, the bad man argument would no longer be available as the basis for the
contention that there is no difference between Justice Roberts’s saving construction and a
decision that plainly upheld the mandate itself (and not just the penalty). The narrowest grounds
rule would then come into play (as described above), and Justice Roberts’s reasoning that the tax
power holding depends on the Commerce Clause holding, in conjunction with the joint dissent of
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, would then operate with the doctrine of vertical
stare decisis to bind the district court. Hypothetical Three strongly suggests that NFIB should be
given vertical stare decisis effect, albeit an effect that is limited to relevantly similar mandates
enforced by criminal penalties (or fines that are unambiguously not taxes).
There is yet another reason to reject the bad man argument. Ultimately, the bad man is
interested in predictions about what the Court will do. As we have already seen, if one adopts a
strongly realist understanding of the doctrine of stare decisis, then the formalities do not matter at
all. If holdings are just our best predictions of what courts will do, then we determine the
holdings of the United States Supreme Court by the rule of five: the holding of a case is
determined by counting votes. On that strongly realist conception, the key fact about NFIB
would be that five members of the Court endorsed an understanding of the Commerce Clause
that would invalidate the individual mandate, to the extent that its validity depends on that
clause.
Recall that the role of the bad man theory in our present discussion is to undermine the
argument that there is a difference between Justice Roberts’s saving construction of the
individual mandate and an alternative outcome in which the individual mandate was upheld
without a saving construction. The realist theoretical underpinnings of the bad man theory
undermine the realist argument that the Commerce Clause reasoning is unnecessary to the
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decision because legal obligations collapse into the rewards and punishments that enforce them.
The application of the rule of five to Hypothetical Three makes this clear: given the current
composition of the Court, the best prediction is that the Court would strike down an attempt by
Congress to attach direct criminal penalties to the ACA.
Moreover, from the perspective of a realist, we might ask what the lower courts are
actually likely to do with Commerce Clause arguments that cite Part III-B of Justice Roberts’s
opinion and the joint dissent by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Given the highly
convoluted nature of the theoretical arguments and the uncertain state of stare decisis doctrine,
one might believe that different lower court judges are likely to reach different results on the
stare decisis question, depending on their view of the merits of the Commerce Clause issue or
even their view of the desirability of the statutory provision that is the subject of a Commerce
Clause challenge. That is, from the realist perspective, one effect of NFIB is to enable litigators
to cite the opinion of Justice Roberts and the joint dissent of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito as binding authority (and in the alternative as persuasive authority). Of course, judges
who disagree with these five Justices may reject the argument that the authority is binding and
find the arguments unpersuasive. Likewise, judges who agree with Roberts and the authors of the
joint dissent may accept the argument that NFIB is binding on the Commerce Clause issue and
find the reasoning persuasive. This fact will become important when we consider the indirect
effects of NFIB. From the realist perspective, the Commerce Clause reasoning of these five
Justices creates an opening for constitutional contestation.
Have the lower courts treated NFIB as binding authority on the Commerce Clause issue?
It is too early to draw conclusions from the handful of reported decisions. In United States v.
Henry,98 the Ninth Circuit noted the existence of a controversy concerning the question of
whether the Commerce Clause reasoning in NFIB was holding or dicta.99 In United States v.
Cabrera-Gutierrez, the same circuit rejected an challenge to the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act based on the theory that it constituted an “individual mandate,” but did not
comment on the status of the commerce clause discussion in Sebeleus.100 In United States v.
Rose, the Sixth Circuit treated the commerce clause discussion in NFIB as a holding, stating
“The Court determined that the mandate ‘cannot be sustained’ under Congress's Commerce
Clause power because it forces into commerce individuals who have elected to refrain from such
commercial activity, which goes beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers.” 101
A number of district court opinions seem to assume that it is a holding. In United States
v. Moore,102 the Eastern District of Washington issued an opinion that was far from clear, but on
its surface the opinion seems to read NFIB as creating a rule placing regulation of “compelled”
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activity outside the Commerce Clause.103 The District of South Carolina in McElveen v. Mike
Reichenbach Ford Lincoln, Inc.104 stated “because the Commerce Clause permits power over
‘activity,’ it does not support the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act because it would
permit Congress to regulate inactivity rather than existing commercial activity.”105 In United
States v. Williams,106 the Southern District of Florida stated “the Court [in NFIB] found
Congress's attempt to require everyone to buy health insurance exceeded its power under the
commerce clause.”107 A recent decision by the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed
several decisions and concluded that the NFIB held, “Commerce Clause permits Congress to
regulate intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but may not do
so by compelling those activities.” 108
Some commentators have assumed that the commerce clause reasoning constitutes a
holding; for example, Pamela Karlan wrote, “in NFIB, a five-Justice majority took an exit ramp,
holding that the Affordable Care Act's minimum coverage provision—§ 5000A, which requires
that a large proportion of Americans carry health insurance—exceeded Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.”109
Our analysis so far suggests that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts’s
opinion is part of the holding in NFIB—on either a realist or formalist understanding of the
doctrine of vertical stare decisis. But even if the analysis is not correct, it may nonetheless be the
case that many lower courts believe that they are bound by the Commerce Clause reasoning: the
cases decided so far suggest that at least some federal district judges do believe they are bound
by the Commerce Clause reasoning in NFIB. None of these opinions actually invalidated a
federal statute, and district court opinions do not have stare decisis force in any event, but the
reported cases provide evidence that the lower federal courts take the Commerce Clause
reasoning in Justice Roberts’s opinion seriously.
Even so, it is not clear that the doctrine of vertical stare decisis will make a practical
difference to the outcome of future Commerce Clause litigation. Whatever the Commerce Clause
holding of NFIB is, it is narrow, applying only to individual mandates or regulations predicated
on forced participation in a national market. Indeed, part of the litigation strategy of the plaintiffs
in NFIB was to argue that the individual mandate was unprecedented—precisely in order to
avoid the impression that a decision invalidating the mandate would require the wholesale
reversal of New Deal precedent expanding the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.
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But suppose that a lower federal court did, properly or plausibly, rely on NFIB to strike
down a statute that could not be upheld as a tax—in a case like that in Hypothetical Three, in
which a statute is enforced by an explicitly criminal penalty of imprisonment. The Supreme
Court is almost certain to grant certiorari in such a case, and once the case is in the Supreme
Court, the doctrine of vertical stare decisis no longer applies. Instead, the issue becomes one of
horizontal stare decisis.
C.

Horizontal Stare Decisis

A third form of direct legal effect is horizontal stare decisis. Some courts afford binding
effect to their own prior decisions. Some circuits of the United States courts of appeals follow a
rule that requires three-judge panels to follow circuit law but allows the en banc court (or en
banc panels of the court) to overrule a prior decision of the circuit.110 The United States Supreme
Court does not consider itself bound by its own prior decisions but does take the position that
they have legal force.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,111 the Court described its
practice as follows:
[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an “inexorable
command,” and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case. Rather, when
this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency
of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we
may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification.112
Given this extraordinarily flexible standard, it seems unlikely that NFIB would stand in
the way of a Supreme Court majority with strongly held views of the merits. But this does not
entail that the holdings in NFIB could not play an important role. The conventions that govern
briefing and argument in the Supreme Court make it likely that holdings and disputes over
holdings would play a substantial role in shaping the presentation of the case. And it is certainly
possible that a given Justice who was persuaded that an issue was decided in NFIB would
consider that fact to be important and perhaps decisive, if the Justice would otherwise have been
on the fence.
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The possible role of NFIB in the Supreme Court can be illustrated by hypotheticals
involving three possible worlds in which the Supreme Court has different members with
different reactions to briefs that cite NFIB. The three hypotheticals can be stated as follows, with
“liberal” and “conservative” used as proxies for expansive and restrictive understandings of the
Commerce Clause.
Hypothetical Four: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined the joint dissent
resigns and is replaced by a liberal Justice. A case comes before the Court in
which the party challenging the legislation argues that the outcome is controlled
by the reasoning of Justice Roberts’s opinion on the Commerce Clause issue. The
five liberal Justices reject this argument and reason that even if NFIB had
precedential value, it should not control under the Casey standard.
Hypothetical Five: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion resigns and is replaced by a conservative Justice. A case comes before the
Court, and the government argues that Justice Roberts’s opinion on the
Commerce Clause issue is obiter dictum and that Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
correctly states the law. The six conservative Justices reject the government’s
argument and reason that NFIB has precedential value under the narrowest
grounds rule, which under the Casey standard should control.
Hypothetical Six: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined the joint dissent
resigns and is replaced by a moderately conservative Justice. A case comes before
the Court in which the party challenging the legislation argues that the outcome is
controlled by the reasoning of Justice Roberts’s opinion on the Commerce Clause
issue. The new Justice is on the fence about the merits of the Commerce Clause
claim but is convinced that NFIB has precedential force, and this tips the balance
against the government and for the plaintiff.
All three hypotheticals are plausible. Of course, partisans of an expansive Commerce
Clause are likely to believe that the reasoning in Hypothetical Four is correct, and the reasoning
in Hypotheticals Five and Six is incorrect—and vice versa for partisans of a restrictive reading of
the Clause. The point is that the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis in Casey, when juxtaposed
with the opinions in NFIB, creates the space for constitutional contestation of Commerce Clause
doctrine in the Supreme Court.
***
NFIB clearly has already had important direct legal effects on the validity and
implementation of the ACA. And NFIB may have some important vertical stare decisis effects
with respect to the Anti-Injunction Act and conditional spending issues. A strong case can be
made that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts’s opinion should have vertical stare
decisis effect in a narrow range of possible future cases, but it is less clear that its vertical stare
decisis effects will have practical importance for future Commerce Clause disputes. In the long
run, the Commerce Clause implications of NFIB will be decided in the Supreme Court, and the
fragmented opinions in NFIB are not likely to be decisive. But not all legal effects are direct. The
most important legal consequences of NFIB may be its indirect legal effects.
IV. INDIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS: A CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT SHIFT
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Supreme Court opinions have indirect effects on constitutional practice. These indirect
effects can be mediated in a variety of ways. A Supreme Court decision may trigger a
constitutional backlash that mobilizes popular opinion against the result in the case. Or the
decision might play a role in changing social norms, with a subsequent feedback loop into future
judicial decisions. In this essay, we will focus on a particular kind of indirect legal effect—which
we will call a “constitutional gestalt shift.”
A.

Constitutional Contestation as a Complex Argumentative Practice

The indirect consequences of Supreme Court decisions must be viewed in light of the
idea that, as a descriptive matter, constitutional practice is constituted in part by a complex
argumentative practice.113 That practice is governed by a set of norms. Some of those norms are
like rules—they are relatively hard and fast with bright lines and hard edges. You cannot argue
to a district court that it should overrule a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court—
the move is off the wall, out of bounds, and beyond the pale. Some of the norms can be
reconstructed as standards—soft and loose, vague and ambiguous. You can argue, in some
circumstances, that the Supreme Court should overrule one of its prior decisions, but it is
difficult to know in advance when this move will be encouraged and when the Court will shut it
down. Some Supreme Court decisions are canonical—any doctrinal theory must count such
decisions as correctly decided. Other decisions are anticanonical—they are paradigm cases of
incorrectness.114 You might be able to argue that District of Columbia v. Heller115 or Wickard v.
Filburn116 was wrongly decided, but not Brown v. Board of Education117 or Marbury v.
Madison.118 You cannot argue that Lochner v. New York119 was correctly decided. The norms
that govern the complex practice of constitutional argument are dynamic, changing over time in
response to both politics and developments within the practice itself.
B.

Persuasive Authority

Before we turn to the idea of a constitutional gestalt, we should note the existence of
another particular kind of move in the complex argumentative practice that structures
constitutional contestation. The concept of persuasive authority is not well theorized, but the
intuitive idea is clear. Dicta in cases and the reasoning of nonauthoritative sources may persuade
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judges to adopt legal rules, but the force of persuasive authority is nonbinding. Persuasive
authority has four distinct but related components: (1) persuasion by reasons, (2) persuasion by
epistemic authority, (3) persuasion by predictive authority, and (4) persuasion by legitimating
authority. Consider each of the four components.
First, persuasion by the independent force of reasons is independent of the person or
institution that provides the reasons: in this regard, the reasons of Supreme Court Justices are
equally persuasive as the same reasons when provided by a student law review note. Each of the
nonbinding opinion segments in NFIB can be a source of persuasion by reasons.
Second, consider persuasion by epistemic authority. Of course, most of us are inclined to
regard what is written by a Supreme Court Justice or eminent academic authorities as more
persuasive than what is written in student notes, even though it is sometimes the case that the
latter are sometimes correct when they disagree with either of the former. This is because we
regard some persons or institutions as epistemic authorities.
The idea of epistemic authority is related to a general approach to knowledge known as
social epistemology (or “epistemics”) that is strongly associated with the philosopher Alvin
Goldman.120 Whereas individual epistemology (or “epistemology”) “identif[ies] and evaluate[s]
psychological processes that occur within the epistemic subject,” the related inquiry of social
epistemology aims to “identify and evaluate social processes by which epistemic subjects
interact with other agents who exert causal influence on their beliefs.”121 In the sense I am using
the term, an “epistemic authority” is someone to whom some group defers because of the
authority’s expertise.122
The opinions of Supreme Court Justices may be viewed as epistemic authorities because
of the belief in the legal expertise of the Justices. The relationship that creates epistemic
authority might be viewed as dyadic—a relationship between a pair consisting of the possibile
epistemic authority and the individual who might defer to the epistemic authority. A given lower
court judge, say Learned Hand, might not view a given Supreme Court Justice, say Tom Clark,
as an epistemic authority or even as an epistemic peer or equal. But many judges, lawyers, and
scholars are likely to view Supreme Court Justices as epistemic authorities, at least on some
topics.
Third, opinions of the Justices may persuade because of their predictive value. We have
already examined the realist or predictive view of vertical stare decisis above. Now we consider
the premises of that theory from a different angle—not as a theory of precedent, but as a theory
of persuasive authority. Lower court judges may view the opinions of the Supreme Court as
persuasive because they provide a basis for predicting the future behavior of the Court and hence
the likelihood that the Court would reverse a lower court’s decision. Lower court judges may
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wish to avoid reversal, even if they reject the bad man theory of law.123
Fourth, opinions of the Justices may have what we might call “legitimating authority.”
Given legal culture, legal arguments may be viewed as requiring legitimacy. A constitutional
argument is legitimate if it is sound or cogent and premised on the constitutional text or the
holding of a Supreme Court case. On the other hand, a constitutional argument that reasoned
from the writings of Karl Marx or Ayn Rand might be thought to lack legitimacy. Given our
legal culture, arguments based on Supreme Court dicta or on concurring or dissenting opinions
of individual Justices are legitimating—these are legitimate sources of authority within the
complex argumentative practice of law.
Putting these pieces together, we might postulate that the full persuasive authority of a
nonbinding Supreme Court opinion is a complex function of the reasons it provides, the
epistemic authority of the author and those who join the opinion, the predictive value of the
opinion, and its legitimating effect. Different judges may have different “persuasion
functions”—some may count reasons heavily and predictive value lightly, or vice versa.
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to believe that reasons supported by opinions joined by five
Supreme Court Justices will be viewed as having epistemic authority, predictive value, and
legitimating authority—at least, pro tanto.
In the discussion that follows, we will be examining the relationship between the
opinions in NFIB and the constitutional gestalt. That discussion will be based on the role of those
opinions in the complex practice of constitutional argument and the relationship between that
practice and constitutional politics. The legal effect of the Commerce Clause reasoning of the
Chief Justice and the joint dissent is likely to be disputed.124 Holdings are not merely persuasive;
they are binding on lower courts. There are arguments for the assertion that the reasoning of
Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissent on the Commerce Clause gives rise to a holding. But
these arguments can be disputed, and in the dialectical process of argumentation, the fallback
position of litigants that rely on the Commerce Clause reasoning is likely to be that it constitutes
persuasive authority. In that process, the epistemic authority of the Justices, the predictive value
of five votes, and the legitimating authority of the institutional role of the Justices are all likely to
play a role. Of course, persuasive authority is only persuasive—it can be overcome by the
balance of reasons. But the combination of epistemic, predictive, and legitimating authority can
change the context in which reasons are evaluated, making reasons that would be “off the wall”
without such persuasive authority into reasons that are “on the wall” and hence potentially
warrant changes in the law.
C.

Constitutional Gestalts

When viewed from a distance, the system of norms that govern the complex practice of
constitutional argument can be seen as organized into large-scale patterns. These patterns can be
represented in various ways, including doctrinal summaries, normative theories, and narratives.
Particular cases may be considered canonical: the canonical cases are paradigms; their reasoning
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and outcomes can be used as premises in constitutional argument.125
At any given time, there may be a dominant constitutional gestalt—an overall picture of
the constitutional landscape. It is important to understand that the constitutional gestalt does not
settle all constitutional questions. Given the dominant constitutional gestalt, some territory may
be mapped as disputed—subject to contestation in constitutional litigation and between the
various branches of government. Given the same dominant constitutional gestalt, other territory
may be mapped as beyond dispute—outside the bounds of constitutional contestation because of
settled constitutional norms.
It may be helpful to provide a visual representation of the idea of a constitutional gestalt
in terms of three related ideas: (1) constitutional doctrines, (2) normative constitutional theories,
and (3) constitutional narratives:

125.
The notion of a constitutional gestalt should be distinguished from the idea of a “paradigm” or
“constitutional paradigm.” Although the word “paradigm” in its primary sense is simply that of an example or
central case, there is a related idea of paradigms that is derived from the work of Thomas Kuhn in the philosophy of
science. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). A Kuhnian paradigm
consists of “consensus on exemplary instances of scientific research,” that in turn gives rise to an agreement on such
further fundamentals as particular theories, procedures, instrumentation, and scientific language. Alexander Bird,
Thomas Kuhn, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 11, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomaskuhn. In the legal context, the analogue of a Kuhnian paradigm would be a case, or set of cases, that serves as the
focal point of agreement among the community of legal practitioners. Agreement on a set of canonical cases could
in turn give rise to agreement on other basic ideas, including legal-argument types, styles of opinion writing, and
citation practices. Although there are affinities between the notion of a constitutional paradigm and a constitutional
gestalt, the two concepts have distinct content and functional expressions.
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FIGURE 1: CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALTS
Figure 1 represents the relationship between gestalt, doctrine, theory, and narrative as a
hierarchy of abstraction. Constitutional gestalts are highly abstract representations of the content
of constitutional doctrines, theories, and narratives. (For the purpose of this discussion, the
phrase “constitutional doctrine” is used in an inclusive sense that incorporates both judicially
created doctrines and constitutional norms and practices that arise outside the courts.)
Consider the subset of constitutional doctrine that defines national legislative power. The
content of the doctrine as a whole is the conjunction of the content of a multitude of particular
constitutional rules. That content can itself be described at various levels of generality. At the
level of detail, there will be highly particularized rules governing specific kinds of legislative
action (e.g., rules defining an excise tax). At the highest level of abstraction, there will be rules
that attempt to capture the structural features of the detail (e.g., the rational basis test). The
constitutional gestalt is not a theory of the doctrine—although such theories may be supported or
undermined by the gestalt. Rather, the gestalt organizes our perception of cases, rules, and
doctrinal theories.126
Similarly, we can construct constitutional narratives about the development of national
legislative power. One such narrative prominently features the resolution of the conflict between

126.
My understanding of the relationship between the constitutional gestalt and doctrines is indebted
to Duncan Kennedy’s account of the phenomenology of judging. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1997); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 45 (J. Boyle ed., 1992).
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President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court—one version emphasizes 1937, telling a story of the
events that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.127
and to subsequent decisions (e.g., Wickard v. Filburn) and assertions of national legislative
power (e.g., the Great Society). Such narratives can be vindicating or debunking. A vindicating
narrative tells a story that places a vector of constitutional development in a normatively
favorable light. A debunking narrative tells the story in a way that puts the vector in a
normatively unfavorable light. The same set of events could be the subject of clashing narratives,
some of which are vindicating and while others are debunking.128
Vindicating and debunking narratives are normatively charged, but there is another
category of narrative, which we might dub “causal” that focuses on causal relationships between
actions and events—although a causal narrative might have implicit normative implicature.129
The constitutional gestalt is not a narrative, but it may make some narratives salient and plausible
and other narratives beside the point or implausible.
Finally, we can construct normative constitutional theories. Originalism is such a theory:
in one prominent version, it argues that constitutional practice should be constrained by the
original public meaning of the text.130 In the context of the Commerce Clause, most versions of
originalism are critical of the basic contours of current doctrine.131 But one prominent public
meaning originalist, Jack Balkin, provides a normative defense of the kind of Commerce Clause
doctrine offered in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in NFIB.132 Normative constitutional theories
come in many shapes and sizes, ranging from Ronald Dworkin’s theory, law as integrity, which
see’s constitutional law as a function of the normative theory that best fits and justifies the law as
a whole133 to meso- or micro-level normative accounts of particular clauses, statutes, regulations,
or cases. Constitutional gestalts are not normative constitutional theories, but such theories may
be more or less consistent with the constitutional gestalt. During periods in which there is a
dominant constitutional gestalt, the plausibility of normative theories will depend, in part, on
their consistency with the gestalt.

127.

301 U.S. 1 (1937).

128.
There is a third possibility: constitutional history could be neutral. On the role of constitutional
narratives, see Lawrence B. Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 597.
129.
Implicature refers to saying one thing but meaning something else. See Wayne Davis, Implicature,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/.
130.

See CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 113, at 1-36.

131.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 105 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167,
189-91 (1996); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55
Ark. L. Rev. 1185, 1199 (2003).
132.
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 138-182 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2010). For a critique of Balkin’s theory, see Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin's Interaction Theory of
“Commerce”, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623.
133.
379-99 (1986).

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977) RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

34

Constitutional Gestalt

Constitutional gestalts operate at a level of abstraction that floats above doctrines,
theories, and narratives. You might think of a constitutional gestalt as the big picture that
integrates a high-level description of doctrine with vindicating narratives and justifying
normative theories. Gestalts organize our perceptions of particulars, but the content of the gestalt
is not identical to the content of the particulars. A gestalt view of national legislative power
relates generalizations about constitutional doctrine (“The commerce power is virtually plenary
and subject to rational basis scrutiny”) to normative theories (e.g., the scope of national power
should be decided by an elected body) and vindicating narratives (“Expansive Commerce Clause
doctrine emerged from a conflict between an antidemocratic Supreme Court and a President and
Congress vested with extraordinary constitutional authority by ‘We the People’”).
Gestalts organize the content of doctrines, theories, and narratives—they frame our
perceptions. Because a gestalt is not the content it frames, it is difficult to capture a gestalt as an
explicit set of propositions. Slogans may be useful, even when the slogan is obviously wrong at
the level of detail: for example, the statement “Commerce Clause power is virtually unlimited” is
a good slogan but not an accurate description at a fine-grained level of detail. Metaphors may
also be useful: for example, “islands of state sovereignty in a sea of federal power.”134 Slogans
and metaphors can represent the gist of a constitutional gestalt, but the gestalt itself is a mental
construct that organizes perceptions of the legal materials.
The idea of a constitutional gestalt can be clarified by invoking the familiar distinction
between the internal and external point of view.135 Imagine a hypothetical judge, Alice, whose
perceptions of constitutional doctrine is shaped by a constitutional gestalt. When Alice engages
in constitutional practice (e.g., deliberates in the course of deciding a case), she can and
characteristically will engage the legal materials (cases and clauses) from the internal point of
view—and that point of view will have been shaped by the constitutional gestalt. Now imagine a
hypothetical scholar, Ben, who wants to explain Alice’s decisions. Ben can attempt to
reconstruct the constitutional gestalt that shaped Alice’s understandings of the law from the
external point of view. For Ben, the constitutional gestalt is a feature of Alice’s cognitive
apparatus. Ben can reconstruct the content of the gestalt by taking up Alice’s point of view as a
participant observer in constitutional practice.
Some of the most interesting developments in constitutional practice occur during periods
of gestalt shift—when one picture gives way to another. The mechanisms by which such shifts
occur may be various. A constitutional gestalt shift might sneak up on the community of
constitutional actors—their perception of the overall pattern might gradually change without
their even noticing. But constitutional gestalt shifts can also be the subject of intense
constitutional contestation. Such contestation may occur in constitutional litigation, or it might
occur through the articulation of constitutional visions outside the courts. In some cases, perhaps
typically, a constitutional gestalt shift will be the subject of contestation in multiple contexts.
Arguments may occur in the public sphere, in the legal academy, in legislative and executive

134.
Randy Barnett, Commentary, William Rehnquist, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 6, 2005),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/william-rehnquist.
135.

See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91 (2d ed. 1994).
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forums within both state and national political institutions, and in the courts of law.
We can represent the process of constitutional contestation visually as the relationship
between overlapping fields (or arenas) of discourse:
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FIGURE 2: THE FIELD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTESTATION
The influence of a judicial opinion, such as NFIB, on the process of contestation will vary with
the context; different arenas of discouse may be governed by different norms. For example,
contestation via formal legal arguments presented to courts will be heavily influenced by judicial
opinions because the conventions of the complex argumentative practice give substantial weight
to precedent, especially the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional issues. In other
forums, Supreme Court opinions may play a less direct or less constraining role. In public
political discourse among citizens, the opinions of the Supreme Court may be ignored or subject
to intense criticism. Constitutional contestation can be structured by a dominant constitutional
gestalt, but when the gestalt itself is contested, there may be a complex relationship among
constitutional arguments presented within the various sites of constitutional contestation.
When a gestalt shift occurs, our big picture view of the constitutional landscape changes.
Contested territory becomes settled. Undisputed norms are questioned. Constitutional arguments
that passed the laugh test become subject to ridicule. Arguments that once were “off the wall”
are now seen as “on the wall.” A familiar visual image conveys the notion of a gestalt shift
vividly:136

136.
The image is available via Wikimedia Commons. File: Duck-Rabbit illusion.jpg, WIKIMEDIA
COMMONS, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Duck-Rabbit_illusion.jpg (last updated Mar. 29, 2006).
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FIGURE 3: DUCK RABBIT
This is the “duck rabbit,” which originally appeared in Popular Science,137 was made
famous by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations138 and has been
memorialized in popular culture as the theme of sitcom episodes139 and on beer labels.140 When
perceptions of the image move from duck to rabbit or vice versa, a gestalt shift has occurred.
Constitutional gestalt shifts are more complex than the simple duck-to-rabbit or rabbit-toduck, image shift. The relevant objects of constitutional perception are multitudinous in number
and complex in structure. Indeed, if the relevant constitutional data (bits of constitutional text,
arguments by lawyers, reasons in opinions, pronouncements by nonjudicial officials, and so
forth) are viewed one-by-one as particulars, the resulting mass of relevant inputs into the practice
of constitutional argument is both vast and chaotic. Constitutional gestalts (supported by
doctrinal theories, normative constitutional theories, and narratives) organize multitudinous,
complex constitutional particulars into relatively simple pictures composed of a manageable set
of elements.
D.

Competing Constitutional Gestalts: Understandings of the New Deal Settlement

In NFIB, the United States Supreme Court heard six hours of oral argument over three
days.141 The plaintiff-respondents argued that the Supreme Court should affirm the Eleventh
Circuit and invalidate the Affordable Care Act, the most important piece of social legislation
since the Great Society programs of the 1960s. When the litigation began, almost all observers
argued that this challenge bordered on the frivolous, perhaps even triggering Rule 11

137.

Jastrow, J. “The Mind's Eye.” Popular Sci. Monthly 54, 299-312, 1899.

138.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 194 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., Basil
Blackwell 1963).
139.

How I Met Your Mother: Rabbit or Duck (CBS television broadcast Feb. 8, 2010).

140.

THE DUCK-RABBIT CRAFT BREWERY, http://www.duckrabbitbrewery.com/ (last visited May 16,

141.

Blackman, supra note 14, at xxiii.

2012).
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sanctions.142 After oral argument, perceptions had changed, and many observers predicted that
the challenge to the ACA would prevail.143
What happened? Undoubtedly, many things. Jack Balkin has observed that politics and
political parties played an important role, perhaps the crucial role, in combination with
intellectual and social movements.144 But the role of political institutions is mediated by
constitutional understandings that help to shape the space within which politics can operate. The
constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act began its journey to the Supreme Court in an
intellectual environment shaped by a constitutional gestalt that structured the field of
constitutional argument. This journey ended with the Supreme Court itself caught in the midst of
a potential gestalt shift.
1.

Gestalt One: The Dynamic New Deal Settlement

The New Deal Settlement is a familiar trope in constitutional discourse,145 sometimes
associated with footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.146 The New Deal
Settlement was the product of a complex set of actions and events, including legislation,
presidential speeches, and judicial decisions. One might think of the New Deal Settlement as
constitutional doctrine, articulated in Supreme Court decisions and further refined in legal
scholarship and lower court opinions. But for the purposes of this essay, I want to look at the
New Deal Settlement as a central organizing idea within a constitutional gestalt—the big picture
and not the doctrinal details. One might limit the New Deal Settlement chronologically to the

142.
See Blackman, supra note 14, at 185; David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors
Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming); Andrew Koppelman, Bad
News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011);
Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Constitutional Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted the Law in Striking down
Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A25; Randy Barnett, A Weird Victory for Federalism,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-weird-victory-for-federalism/;
Ezra Klein & Charles Fried, Reagan’s Solicitor General: ‘Health Care is Interstate Commerce. Is This a Regulation
of It? Yes. End of Story.’, WASH. POST WONKBLOG, Mar. 28, 2012, 1:09 PM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/reagans-solicitor-general-health-care-is-interstate-commerceis-this-a-regulation-of-it-yes-end-of-story/2011/08/25/gIQAmaQigS_blog.html
143.
See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Neal Katyal on Defending Obamacare, WASH. POST WONKBLOG, Mar. 28,
2012, 2:36 PM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/neal-katyal-on-defendingobamacare/2012/03/28/gIQAHpksgS_blog.html.
144.
JACK M. BALKIN, CONTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 174-225 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, From Off the
Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC, June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM,
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challengewent-mainstream/258040.
145.
See Charles H. Clarke, Supreme Court Assault on the Constitutional Settlement of the New Deal:
Garcia and National League of Cities, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39, 79 (1986); Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan
Getchell, Jr. & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Why the Debate over the Constitutionality of the Federal Health Care Law Is
About Much More than Health Care, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 293, 323 (2011); Norman R. Williams, The People’s
Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257, 281–82 (2004).
146.
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV.
4, 14 (2001); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Roosevelt presidency, perhaps with an extension for Truman. But for our purposes, we will focus
on an extended period that begins with 1937 and extends to include Warren and Burger Court
decisions and Great Society legislation. Finally, we shall focus only on congressional power
pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, although the New Deal
Settlement also includes positions on individual rights and separation of powers.
During the period covered by the extended New Deal Settlement, Commerce Clause
doctrine was fairly complex. The constitutional gestalt was actually much simpler. The core idea
of the gestalt was that Congress had plenary and virtually unlimited legislative power—subject,
of course, to the limits imposed by the individual rights provisions of the Constitution.147 The
gestalt was a summary (though not necessarily an accurate summary148) of many particular
doctrines, their interactions, and the effects they produced. These doctrines included the
presumption of constitutionality, the rational basis test, and the cumulative effects test articulated
in Wickard v. Filburn. The gestalt provided a heuristic for interpreting the individual doctrines
and their interrelationships. Because of its very nature, the gestalt was a simplifying
representation of the state of the doctrine. The gestalt was formulated in terms of “virtually
unlimited” national legislative power. It might turn out that the general picture of plenary and
virtually unlimited power was inaccurate as to some details. The fabric of national legislative
power might have a rip here and a tear there, but such gaps were viewed as contestable
anomalies. Arguments for minor alterations in doctrine that would mend the tears were on the
table. However, arguments for the wholesale expansion of these holes in the fabric of plenary
and unlimited power were off the wall. Therefore, we can characterize the constitutional gestalt
as the “Dynamic New Deal Settlement” with doctrine growing and changing so as to
accommodate expansions in national power. Expansions were initiated by Congress and the
President and then ratified by the Supreme Court in the event they were challenged.
The New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court posed a challenge to the
constitutional gestalt that read the New Deal Settlement as creating plenary and unlimited
national legislative power. In particular, United States v. Lopez149 and United States v.
Morrison150 reasoned from premises that were inconsistent with the prevailing constitutional
gestalt. Before these cases were decided, the prevailing view was that these challenges would
fail. After the challenges succeeded, the predominant reaction was to fit them into the gestalt.
One strategy was to characterize these decisions as incoherent and hence as without generative
force.151 Another strategy was to suggest that these cases were merely symbolic reminders by the

147.

See supra note 9 (collecting references to Congress’s virtually unlimited power).

148.
I owe special thanks to Laura Donohue for emphasizing the idea that the gestalt may be based on
an inaccurate account of the doctrine or a factually incorrect constitutional narrative.
149.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).

150.

529 U.S. 598 (2000).

151.
See, e.g., Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616 (2001) (stating that “lower courts are left
to decipher an incoherent and unworkable rule under the standards articulated in Lopez and reiterated in Morrison”).
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Supreme Court to Congress of the theoretical limits on legislative powers.152 Another move was
to characterize Gonzales v. Raich153 as depriving Lopez and Morrison of generative force.154 A
final strategy characterized these decisions as exceptional carve-outs from the general rule of
unlimited congressional power.155 One version of this strategy emphasized that any limits
imposed by Lopez and Morrison could be circumvented via the spending power.156
The attitude of the conventional constitutional gestalt to the New Federalism decisions
can be expressed metaphorically. Imagine a sea of federal power that spans the globe. The New
Federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court created islands of state power, including the anticommandeering principle of Printz v. United States157 and New York v. United States,158 the
expanded Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity doctrine of Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman,159 and the Lopez and Morrison limits on the Commerce Clause. Thus,
the prevailing gestalt underwent modification—the ocean of federal power was dotted with
isolated islands of state sovereignty—but the basic pattern (the sea of federal power) remained
intact.160
2.

Gestalt Two: The Frozen New Deal Settlement

But there is another way to understand the New Federalism decisions. Although the
dominant constitutional gestalt postulated virtually unconstrained national legislative power,
Congress had never exercised most of the power that was theoretically available to it. State law
continued to govern most of life, for individuals and institutions. Criminal law, common law tort,
property, and contract, family law, corporate law, and insurance regulation—these are just a few

152.
See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 541, 553 (1995) (suggesting that
Lopez may be “merely anecdotal”).
153.

545 U.S. 1 (2005).

154.
See, e.g., Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the Scope of
Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 2018 (2008) (“[L]ower courts have tended to interpret [Gonzales
v. Raich] as removing any significant limits on congressional power that might have been put in place by Lopez and
Morrison.”).
155.
See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does
the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 765 (2003) (describing Lopez and Morrison as “carving out areas
of state sovereignty”).
156.
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 197475 (1995); Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 1643 (2000); see also
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
116 (“[A]t any time that Congress finds itself limited by [its] delegated regulatory powers . . . Congress need only
attach a condition on a federal spending grant that achieves the same (otherwise invalid) regulatory objective.”).
157.

521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).

158.

505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).

159.

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

160.
As stated, the metaphor does not account for zones of concurrent state and federal power. We can
modify the metaphor by specifying that the ocean of federal power is the zone in which Congress has power to act,
or we might add marshes and swamps to represent zones of concurrent power.
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examples of the pervasive nature of state power, even after the New Deal. Moreover, there was a
mismatch between the big picture gestalt and the micro-level details of constitutional doctrine.
For example, New Deal and Warren Court opinions continued to pay lip service to the scheme of
limited and enumerated powers in Article One of the Constitution.161 These anomalies
constituted the raw materials from which an alternative constitutional gestalt could be wrought.
From the perspective of the conventional constitutional gestalt, it might appear that the
alternative gestalt would necessarily involve a return to the so-called “Constitution in exile”: in
the context of national legislative power, that would imply the repeal of much of the New Deal
and Great Society legislation that constitutes the contemporary regulatory state. That is a
possible alternative constitutional program, but it is radically implausible as an alternative
gestalt. The constitutional gestalt is a simplifying picture of constitutional practice as it exists. As
such, it must incorporate the facts on the ground that constitute the New Deal Settlement.162
For this reason, the alternative gestalt must somehow incorporate the broad outlines of
constitutional doctrine and the existing structure of constitutional practice. The alternative gestalt
must accept the New Deal Settlement, as it now exists. But the alternative gestalt is not required
to endorse a dynamic understanding of the content of the settlement. The resulting alternative
can be summarized as a slogan, “This far, and no farther.”163 The most radical New Deal cases
(e.g., Wickard v. Filburn) are seen as wrong in principle but settled in practice. The New
Federalism cases are seen as a substantial correction in the course of constitutional doctrine and
not as mere symbols or carve-outs. The constitutionality of preexisting New Deal and Great
Society legislation is taken as a given, but the constitutionality of new federal programs is not
taken for granted.
Returning to our oceanic metaphor, the alternative gestalt admits the existence of a great
sea of federal power but insists that there are whole continents above the high tide line. Of
course, the shape of the continents is largely the result of historical accident. The coastlines are
not smooth geometric shapes. There are peninsulas of state authority almost surrounded by
federal power. There are great bays and fjords, where federal authority extends deep into the
reserves of state power. Preserving the status quo is not a matter of elegant doctrines constituted
by a few distinctions rooted in a general theory of federalism. At the doctrinal level, the

161.
See e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (Warren Court case stating “the power to
regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits”); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938) (New Deal era case stating “The subject of federal power is still ‘commerce,’ and
not all commerce but commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.”).
162.
Of course, the current constitutional gestalt can be challenged. Thus, Justice Thomas argued in his
separate dissenting opinion that the substantial effects doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn should be overruled. See supra
Part II.C.7; see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Likewise, originalists
may argue that the New Deal Settlement is consistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text. See Jamal
Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 1013 n.159 (2012) (“[M]any modern originalists
accept much of the Warren Court’s corpus but are comfortable revisiting the New Deal Settlement, which tended to
rein in the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisgenerative capacity.”).
163.
See Randy Barnett, “This Far and No Farther”: Baselines and the Individual Insurance Mandate,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/22/this-far-and-no-fartherbaselines-and-the-individual-insurance-mandate.
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alternative gestalt sanctions and encourages categorical distinctions that may seem arbitrary if
evaluated in isolation, one by one. From the perspective of the alternative constitutional gestalt,
these seemingly arbitrary categorical distinctions make sense when viewed from a distance. They
freeze the New Deal Settlement, as it exists here and now—this far, but no farther.
What is the relationship of the alternative constitutional gestalt to originalism?
Originalism itself is really a family of constitutional theories.164 Nonetheless, we can identify
two ideas at the core of the various versions of originalism: (1) the thesis that the communicative
content of the Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified (the
“fixation thesis”); and (2) the principle that constitutional doctrine and practice should be
constrained by the original meaning of the Constitution (the “constraint principle”).165
Many originalists believe that the New Deal cases expanded Congress’s Commerce
Clause power beyond the limits of original meaning.166 But as a practical matter, it would be
impracticable and costly to undo New Deal and Great Society legislation or to amend the
Constitution to authorize those programs. Some originalists endorse the idea that there can be an
“originalist second best”: given the practical impossibility of the first-best originalist
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the originalist might argue for doctrines that limit
departures from original meaning to those required by practical necessity.167 Such doctrines
mitigate the damage done to original meaning by precedent and practice. Therefore, the
alternative gestalt, the Frozen New Deal Settlement, would stand in a relationship of mutual
support with a normative constitutional theory that supports freezing the limits of national
legislative power as a constitutional second best.
E.

NFIB and the Possibility of a Constitutional Gestalt Shift

We have hypothesized two competing constitutional gestalts. The dominant gestalt
postulates plenary and unlimited national legislative power; the alternative gestalt endorses the
notion of enumerated and limited congressional powers but acknowledges the irreversibility of
the New Deal and Great Society legislative programs.

164.

See CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 113, at 35-36.

165.
Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional
Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (book review).
166.
101 (2001).

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.

167.
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J.
1693, 1748–51 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 311-12 (2008) (discussing
general idea of a constitutional second best). Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Foreword:
System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 (2009) (discussing idea of second-best for
consequentialist originalists). The notion of an originalist second-best can be applied to both outcomes and
reasoning. The second-best outcome would be the outcome in the feasible choice set that most closely approximates
the outcome that would be reached on originalist grounds. The second-best reasoning would be the reasoning in the
feasible choice set that most closely approximate originalist reasons. The feasible choice set could be defined in
terms of the outcomes and reasoning that can command a majority of the judges on a particular court. I am grateful
to Megan Degeneffe for the distinction between second-best outcomes and second-best reasoning.
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Constitutional gestalts do not play a direct role in constitutional litigation. You cannot
cite a gestalt in a brief. The Supreme Court has never directly referred to the New Deal
Settlement—no court has used the phrase in a reported decision. Constitutional gestalts shape our
perceptions of constitutional argument, but they are not arguments themselves. Given the
dominant constitutional gestalt, arguing that the individual mandate was unprecedented should
not have counted for much: on the conventional account, unprecedented assertions of federal
power should be accommodated within the Dynamic New Deal Settlement. Given the alternative
narrative, arguing that the individual mandate was unprecedented was an important move,
establishing the predicate for a categorical rule that would invalidate the Affordable Care Act.
From the perspective of the conventional gestalt, the challenge to the individual mandate was
frivolous. From the alternative perspective, an attack on the Affordable Care Act had a real
possibility of success.
Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB is curious. On the one hand, his discussion of the
taxing power fits the dominant conventional gestalt. The individual mandate should be upheld
because policy choices are reserved for democratic politics and not for the courts. Even if the
Affordable Care Act is best understood as a regulation and not a tax, the Court should adopt a
saving construction that avoids the constitutional problem. On the other hand, Justice Roberts’s
discussion of the Commerce Clause fits the alternative gestalt. The individual mandate is beyond
the Commerce Clause power because it is unprecedented, and the theories under which it is
upheld imply that national legislative power is virtually unlimited. Justice Roberts looks at the
picture and sees both a duck and a rabbit.
The eight remaining members of the Court see either a duck or a rabbit, not both. Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion (joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) affirms the dominant
constitutional narrative—national legislative power is almost unlimited, subject to narrow
categorical exceptions defined by Lopez and Morrison. The joint dissent authored by Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito adopts the alternative gestalt’s core principle of limited and
enumerated federal powers, emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the mandate and framing
the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism decisions as establishing a new gestalt (and not merely as
narrow categorical exceptions to the rule).
V. CONCLUSION: A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT
What will the effects of NFIB be? What are the implications of the unusual pattern of
opinions and reasons offered in this supremely important case? The direct legal effects have
already begun to emerge. In future constitutional litigation over the spending power, NFIB sets
an important precedent and opens the door to future challenges of Congress’s power to influence
the states through conditional spending. In future litigation over national legislative power, the
various opinions on the Commerce Clause are sure to be cited and their precedential force is sure
to be disputed. However these disputes are resolved, the grounds of constitutional contestation
will have changed—the dominant constitutional gestalt has become open to challenge through
formal legal argument in ordinary litigation and through academic disputation.168 From there, the
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Cf. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable Care Act and the Commerce Power: Much Ado About
(Nearly) Nothing, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 35 (2013)(stating that the decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, “suggests
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influence of the opinions is likely to extend to congressional debate and executive deliberation
and ultimately to public political discourse.
There is some evidence that a shift in the constitutional gestalt is already underway. In a
Fourth Circuit oral argument on Liberty University’s challenge Obama administration’s rule that
most employers provide contraceptives in their employee health plans, Judge Diana Gribbon
Motz reportedly stated, ““The Supreme Court opinion puts a new light, it seems to me, on the
Commerce Clause,” Motz said. It sounds like we’re in a new regime [post] NFIB.” 169
The current state of the Court with respect to the constitutional gestalt could hardly be
more evenly divided. Four and one-half Justices adhere to the conventional gestalt; four and onehalf affirm the alternative view of the big picture. Half the Court endorses the dynamic reading
of the New Deal Settlement; the other half sees the New Deal Settlement as frozen. The Court as
an institution and Justice Roberts as an individual are caught in the exact moment of a
constitutional gestalt shift—seeing the rabbit at one moment and the duck in the next. But this
moment cannot last. The constitutional gestalt must eventually settle—one way or the other,
dynamic or frozen.
Before the constitutional challenge to the individual mandate, the constitutional gestalt
seemed settled—not to everyone but to the mainstream community of constitutional practitioners
and scholars. The New Federalism cases had been absorbed into the conventional picture of
plenary and unlimited national legislative power, now subject to very limited categorical
exceptions. The challenge to the Affordable Care Act took advantage of ambiguities in the cases
and doctrines organized by the conventional gestalt. The plaintiffs argued that the mandate was
unprecedented, the New Deal cases distinguishable, and the categorical distinctions in the New
Federalism cases (“economic activity”) were controlling. The United States argued that the
mandate had precedents, the spirit of the New Deal cases controlled, and the New Federalism
cases were distinguishable. If the Supreme Court had rejected the challenge by a vote of eight to
one, as some predicted,170 the conventional gestalt would have been decisively affirmed. Had the
unthinkable happened and the Court had sustained the challenge by a similarly lopsided vote, the
announcement of the decisions would have resounded like a thunderbolt from the heavens, and a
constitutional revolution of the same magnitude as 1937 would have begun.
But on what was truly the main issue, NFIB did not result in an eight-to-one decision, or

that the Roberts Court--in another case, presenting different issues-- might well be willing to curtail Congress's
commerce power significantly”).
169.
Jennifer Haberkorn, “Liberty University pivots in health law challenge,” Politico, May 17, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/liberty-pivots-in-health-law-challenge-91515.html; see also Josh Blackman,
“Judge Motz: NFIB “puts a new light” on the Commerce Clause,” Josh Blackman’s Blog, May 17, 2013,
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/05/17/judge-motz-nfib-puts-a-new-light-on-the-commerce-clause/ (stating “I
think Judge Motz’s characterization of our “new regime” after NFIB is accurate. Her comment is a different way of
describing what Larry Solum has referred to as our shifted “constitutional gestalt.””).
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See Blackman, supra note 14, at 185 (recounting prediction by Douglas Laycock of 8-1 vote);
Scott Whitlock, “Cocky Journalists Declared ObamaCare Would Be Upheld, Maybe by a 8-1 Vote,” June 27, 2012,
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seven-to-two, or six-to-three, or even five-to-four. With respect to the constitutional gestalt, the
outcome was four and one-half to four and one-half, an evenly divided Court. That leaves
constitutional law in a peculiarly unsettled state. For the partisans of unlimited national power,
the old gestalt prevails, and hence the old rules govern the complex practice of constitutional
argument. For them, Justice Roberts was clearly right on the tax power and clearly wrong on
both the Commerce Clause and the spending power. NFIB can be cited for its tax power holding,
but the Commerce Clause discussion is obiter dictum. For them, the lesson of NFIB is clear—the
dike held, the barbarians were held at the gate, and the banner yet waves.
For the partisans of limited and enumerated powers, the fact that five Justices embraced
the alternative gestalt with respect to the Commerce Clause in the context of a challenge to an
important piece of social legislation is profoundly significant. For them, the fact of an equally
divided Court creates the space for constitutional contestation. A whole set of arguments that
were off the wall are now on the table. NFIB can be cited in the lower courts on Commerce
Clause issues—five Justices are as good as a holding for that purpose. For them, NFIB may even
be binding Commerce Clause precedent, albeit in a narrow class of cases. For them, the game is
on. Having fought to a draw on the most unfavorable terrain imaginable, they look forward to the
next match on a level playing field.
NFIB has opened the space for constitutional contestation—and that space is already
being occupied, in the blogs, at academic conferences, in position papers, water cooler
discussions, e-mail exchanges, briefs, and judicial opinions. Competing doctrinal arguments,
theories, and narratives are already in play.
And then what? A shift in the constitutional gestalt requires more than arguments in
constitutional litigation or theories propounded in law review articles, although they may play a
role. A shift in the gestalt can only occur with supporting developments in constitutional politics
off and on the Court. The current state of constitutional equipoise is a product of the transitory
composition of the current Court and a divided government reflecting deep political divisions
among Americans. Things could go one way, or they could go another. The dominant gestalt
could hold. Or we could look back on NFIB as a pivotal moment in a constitutional gestalt shift
that started with the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism cases.
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